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An Institutional Perspective on Corporate Control
and the Network of Interlocking Directorates

Julie A. Caswell

The network of contacts between individuals in positions of power in
the corporate system can be approached from two separate but comple-

mentary perspectives. The first views the network as a sociological phenomenon-as a system for socializing members or potential members of

the upper class in those skills and attitudes necessary for replication of the
current system. The second perspective sees the network as a pragmatic
means to an economic end, the end being higher profits in the corporate
sector and the means being the exchange of information and coordination

of policy between members of the system.
The coexistence of distinct but heavily overlapping networks of contact
parallels these perspectives. Networks of contact established through attendance at exclusive preparatory schools and colleges and through membership in select social and civic organizations may primarily serve the

first function of socialization and generation of group cohesiveness [Dom-

hoff 1967, pp. 12-37]. Corporate interlocking directorates may primarily
serve the second function of coordinating activity and arbitrating conflict
in order to enhance corporate profit performance. Private policy planning
groups such as the Conference Board may, on the other hand, serve both

socialization and coordination functions [Dye 1978].
The major issue of interest in study of these networks is whether their
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existence constitutes evidence that control over corporate and government
decision making is centralized. In other words, the issue is whether elitist
or pluralist views of the organization of our institutions are correct. This
article focuses on the implications for corporate control of one of these
networks of contact, the system of corporate interlocking directorates. At
the same time, it attempts to integrate network analysis with the large
body of work on direct control of corporations through stockholding.

Control in the Corporate Sector

Analysis of corporate control has followed two mostly separate tracks.
The first looks at direct control over corporate decision making through
stockholding or stockholding combined with representation on boards of
directors [Berle and Means 1932; Larner 1970; Kotz 1978]. On this actor

level, control is conceptualized as a dyadic, hierarchic relationship be-

tween two firms, a firm and a family or individual, or a firm and a financial
institution. The body of literature developed on management control is
on this level of analysis. The striking features of this approach is its treat-

ment of the firm as an independent entity operating free of centers of control outside its management and stockholders. As such it is consistent with
the bulk of economic analysis that also assumes independent, albeit in
some cases collusive, decision making by firms.

The second track of analysis conceptualizes control as being exercised

through a network of relationships between firms. Authors using this approach argue that a firm's individual one-to-one relationships can be
properly analyzed only in the context of the entire set of relationships

maintained by the firm and all other firms in the relevant network [Bearde

et al. 1975, pp. 24-29; Mizruchi 1982, p. 52]. The network of relationships used to study corporate control is commonly the set of interlocking
directors, since the board of directors has the power to exercise control
over the corporation.
Direct control is a familiar concept to economists and study of it has

been extensive. The focus of this research has been to ascertain who ex-

ercises control, primarily through stockholding, over the decision making process within the large firms that dominate the U.S. economy. In
the early 1900s, this control was widely believed to be held by a "Money
Trust" of large financiers [Brandeis 1914; Moody 1919]. Adolph A. Berle
and Gardiner C. Means introduced the idea of a managerial revolution
when they suggested in the 1930s that management discretion was in-

creasing as stockholding in large firms became more dispersed [Berle and

Means 1932]. Studies done in the 1960s and 1970s have variously found
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high levels of managerial control [Larner 1970], family control [Burch
1972], and financial control [Kotz 1978]. Even though the diverse research methodologies and samples used by these authors have yielded
mixed results, the conventional wisdom has remained that, by and large,

management control is widespread among large firms in the United States.
The suspected dominance of management control has lead to a strong
interest in the motivations and business strategies of managers versus

owners. Numerous studies of the most widely discussed hypothesis, that
owner-controlled firms are more profitable than those controlled by man-

agement, have not found consistent evidence in its support [Bothwell 1980,
pp. 303-305]. This is not surprising for two reasons. The first, not pursued

here, is that the studies may show no difference between the groups because there is a high level of miscategorization of firms by control type.
In particular, in cases where limited data are available on family or financial control, firms that do have centers of control may be mistakenly cate-

gorized as management-controlled [Burch 1972].
The second explanation is that information on direct control is insufficient in itself to assess the control a firm is under. Firms operate in an
environment made up of direct holders as well as other firms and institutions that may have financial or business relationships with the firm and
may have board representation. As linkages between families and firms
are assessed in the context of a network of relationships, control is clearly
relative to how many actors are involved in a decision, the degree of their
interest, and how much influence they are willing to exercise. The process

of corporate decision making is, therefore, analogous to political decision
making, where "interest groups" vie for control over corporate resources.
It is also analogous in that certain parties to the decision may have the
power necessary to determine the outcome regardless of opposition. A
family-controlled firm with no debt, for example, may be able to make its

decisions without consultation with other parties while a highly leveraged
management-controlled firm may have its scope of action severely limited
by loan covenants.
The network analysis techniques used in the study of interlocking directorates are not generally familiar to economists. This is probably a result

of the focus of economic analysis on competitive relationships. Such relationships assume the independence of the actors involved. Network re-

lationships such as those represented by the system of interlocking directors form an institutional superstructure within which market level

competition or rivalry occurs. As such they form a nexus between competition and coordination and point to extramarket mechanisms that affect

economic performance.
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The major difficulty in using interlocking directorships to study control

of corporate decision making is that their function and content are variable and basically unverifiable. As with networks of social, civic, and
political ties, the network of interlocking directorates is a complex institution that serves several functions simultaneously. Since business decision

making and board meetings are not public, outsiders can gain only hearsay
information on internal corporate matters from the business press. Thus
direct evaluation of the effects of this network are not possible. Its longevity and stability, however, argue for its importance and the need to study

network forms of control [Dooley 1969, p. 322; Allen 1974, p. 404; Bunting 1976, pp. 28-32; Mizruchi 1982, pp. 177-78].

The Function and Content of Interlocking Directorates

The study of interlocking directorates as an institution of corporate
control requires the development of a conceptual framework outlining

their function and content. The legislative history of Section 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914, which restricts interlocking directorates, indicates that
the major concern raised by the practice of interlocking directors was its

effect on business decision making and the level of competition between

firms [Kramer 1950; Halverson 1976]. These ties were, therefore, viewed
as indicative of alliances or control relationships between corporations as
well as the means of carrying them out. Work done since the 1930s has
broadened the issues addressed in studies of interlocking directors and
system level control from what can be characterized as concerns with

maintenance of competition to issues of the existence and replication of
an elite class within American society.
Three authors recently have presented typologies of the possible con-

tent and function of interlocking directorates [Koenig, Gogel, and Son-

quist 1979, pp. 174-77; Mizruchi 1982, pp. 34-44; Palmer 1983, pp. 4042]. A synthesis of these typologies yields five basic approaches to the
study of interlocking directorates. The first approach constitutes the null
hypothesis: exchange of directors is not significant because board members are figureheads in the governance of firms. Control over the firm rests
with management, which chooses outside directors based on friendship or

prestige factors. In this view, linkages through interlocking directors have
no content and serve secondary or basically frivolous functions.

A second approach views exchange of directors as a sociological phenomenon. The system of interlocking directors is seen as a means of con-

solidating and maintaining general control over the corporate sector by
an upper class of American society. Interlocks are not important as rela-
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tionships between specific firms, but as a diffuse set of social relations

that facilitates formation of group consensus and socializes new members

of the class [Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist 1979, pp. 176-77]. The content
of intercorporate personnel ties is, therefore, relationships between upper-

class individuals and their function is to buttress general upper-class control.

The three remaining approaches emphasize economic motivations for
intercorporate ties. In each case, one or the other or both of the firms

involved seek contact with the other firm in order to advance their economic interests. Mark Mizruchi labels these three approaches coordina-

tion, cooptation, and control. [Mizruchi 1982]. The basic differences
between them is in the conceptualization of the power relationships between the firms. From the coordination perspective, interlocking directors
are a means of harmonizing policy for mutual benefit. The important characteristic of these types of ties is their reciprocal nature-the parties are

involved in a non-hierarchical relationship. The content of interlocking
directorates, from this perspective, is ties between firms that have regular
exchange or market contact with each other and the function is to coordinate mutually beneficial policy.

The remaining two paradigms view interlocks as hierarchical relationships. The cooptation or resource dependency paradigm, relying on a
management control perspective, views the firm as an independent entity
under management direction that actively seeks to place on its board
people affiliated with other firms that control resources crucial to its operation. These people are coopted in the sense that their intimate contact

with the firm makes it possible for the management to gain their support

and cooperation. In contrast to the coordination view, the relationship is
hierarchical in that only one member of the pair is active and powerful
while the other subordinates its interests to some degree. The content of

interlocking directors is again ties between firms that have a regular exchange or market contact, but the function is to allow one firm to be more
effective through cooptation of the other.

The final perspective views intercorporate ties as a control relationship
through which one firm dictates or influences the other firm's policies for
its own benefit. The relationship is hierarchical, as with cooptation, but

the flow of influence is assumed to be in the opposite direction. The same

relationship can often be interpreted from both perspectives. For example, Donald R. Grangaard was president, chief executive officer, and

director of First Bank System, Inc. (Minneapolis) in 1976. He was also
a director of George A. Hormel & Company. This interlock can be viewed

alternatively as a move by Hormel to coopt First Bank System, a source
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of capital, or as a move by First Bank System to place its representative
on Hormel's board to monitor and influence corporate policy.
From the standpoint of economic analysis, the last three perspectives
are most relevant. Although the system of interlocking directorates undoubtedly serves to generate cohesiveness within the upper class in the
United States and this may have indirect effects on economic performance,
the possible market-level coordinating effects of this network have more
direct implications for performance. The magnitude of these effects de-

pends on the structure and strength of ties between firms. If ties tend to be
dyadic and each firm has only a few such ties, the overall effect will probably be less than if groups of firms are closely interlocked regardless of
whether one views the ties as serving a coordination, cooptation, or control function. On the other hand, whether the tie is hierarchic (reflects
the ability of one firm to direct the other's policy) is also an important
determinant of how much impact the network of interlocking directors
will have on market behavior.

For development of an analytical base for research on interlocking directorates it is probably not necessary to choose between the coordination,
cooptation, and control paradigms. This is especially true since some proportion of these ties likely fit each of the three paradigms. A useful perspective growing out of these approaches is that interlocks reflect working
relationships between firms and are pursued in order to establish regular

forums for exchange of information. The strength of influence in many

cases is such that it constitutes a control relationship in which firms cease
to be independent decision making centers.

Direct and Network Corporate Control

Patterns of corporate control indicate the degree of centralization of

economic, political, and social power in the United States. Clearly, the
less diffuse this power is, the less competitive and democratic our system.

Analysis of the level of centralization requires data on both direct and
network control and its integration into an overall control picture.
Direct control of individual corporations through stockholding and related board representation is the widely researched level of the control

structure. The findings indicate a shifting distribution of owner, financial,
and management control over time. These results shed light on the power
structure of intra-corporate decision making and have implications for
the independence of that decision making.
Inferences on the structure of control drawn at the level of direct con-

trol alone, however, are misleading. In particular, the absence of direct
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control does not indicate that network forms of

On the contrary, recent research on patterns of
sector indicates that strong direct control is associated with the absence
of network ties through interlocking directors while firms without strong
centers of control (the so-called management-controlled firms) have

higher levels of network ties [Caswell 1984]. This line of reasoning leads
to the conclusion that the managerial revolution may be more properly

thought of as a shift in the locus of control to a higher institutional level

of control [Bunting and Mizruchi 1982].
A corollary to the argument that the presence of this type of network
level control or influence implies less dispersion of control than is other-

wise recognized is that conventional measures of aggregate concentration
in the economy are understated. Yet, the system of corporate interlocking
directors is only one facet of the network of interpersonal and intercorporate ties between people and firms in positions of power within the U.S.
system. Analysis of those institutions of control is an essential element in

understanding the functioning of economic markets as well as govern-

mental, education, and social processes. A useful analytical approach to
the study of control in the corporate sector is to distinguish between patterns of direct and network control and build a paradigm that integrates
the findings of each.
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